Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies
Volume 2

Article 15

1-1-1993

Dangerous Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in
Jurisprudence, Peter Fitzpatrick, ed.
C. Harrington Jones

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls
Part of the Law Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 3.0 License.
Recommended Citation
C Harrington Jones, "Dangerous Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence, Peter
Fitzpatrick, ed." (1993) 2 Dal J Leg Stud 339.

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For
more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

339

Dangerous Supplements:
Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence
Peter Fitzpatrick, ed.
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991, 207 pp.
Reviewed by C. Harrington Jones*
With such a title, Dangerous Supplements 1 makes a calculated appeal to the
reader's sense of intellectual adventure. It provokes the armchair adventurer
with an urge not unlike the impulse that drives a skater farther out into a bay,
beyond everyone else, to the point where, at the peril of failing to heed the
darker shades of ice, a glance shoreward can reveal the unfamiliar in the
familiar.
The anthology's editor, Peter Fitzpatrick, plays with this conception from
the outset. In his introduction, Fitzpatrick employs a metaphor that presents the
study of contemporary critical theories of jurisprudence as voyages beyond the
margins of convention. These confrontations are, however, intended to be
intellectual sorties that encounter and assess the others; voices that challenge the
status quo from beyond the limits it seeks to disavow. By their very existence,
these others threaten the foundations of existing law. According to Fitzpatrick,
the status quo has rallied with tactics that maintain hegemony through deft
management of what are recognized as supplements that are dangerous to its
body. "These voyages," he explains, "are never undertaken without the
intention of returning more securely to the point of departure. Challenges from
the surrounding context are thus either rejected or adjusted and absorbed." 2
Assimilation and rejection are the tactics that silence these subversive
voices. Fitzpatrick's goal is, accordingly, to expose and reject these tactics,
thus avoiding "the protective and premature closure around law which
jurisprudence continually seeks to effect."3 In fact, more than that, he hopes to
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2 Ibid. at 1.
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prevent the closure that jurisprudence effects within itself. In attempting to
replace appropriation with acknowledgement, he seeks to establish a dialectic
that provides not only resistance, but also renewal to received authority. The
result would supplant rejection with an uncertain, unsettled process of reformation; it is a conception that views the process itself not as the means to an
end, but as the end of the means. The book explores new historicism, Marxism,
neo-liberalism, feminism, semiotics and deconstruction in turn, and within one
another. Jurisprudence, thereby, moves not only into the wider world of
intellectual exploration, but also recognizes the full extent of its own landscape
and, more importantly, acknowledges this process of recognition.
The anthology presents widely divergent and often incompatible
perspectives. The editor's introduction contains an extensive essay that
illustrates how traditional jurisprudence manages the marginalization of
emerging voices. Linguistic philosophy's tenuous entry into jurisprudence
provides Fitzpatrick with an excellent subject from which to draw out his
theories of rejection and assimilation, thus setting the stage for what is to follow.
Subsequently, David Sugarman mobilizes historic contextualism to explore the
forces that have shaped the development of jurisprudence. Progress has, more
often than not, required the resolution of tensions between competing factions of
educators. In these struggles, political agendas are shown to have often
outweighed logic. The New Right and Marxism, presented in essays by Alan
Thomson and Alan Hunt respectively, are the two subjects that follow. In both
essays, these familiar perspectives are applied to disclose the inherently political
in the supposedly value-neutral project of traditional jurisprudence. Carol
Smart's essay on feminist jurisprudence leads into less familiar territory. She
rejects previous constructive efforts in favour of achieving renewal from beyond
the borders of traditional jurisprudence. The final two essays introduce
semiotics and deconstruction. Unfortunately, both focus their attentions
specifically on British institutions. These chapters, by Peter Goodrich and Yifat
Hachamovitch, and Anthony Carty, are nonetheless worth exploring.
The first essay, Fitzpatrick's, is a study of H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of
Law. Fitzpatrick views Hart's attempt to redefine positivist jurisprudence as the
failed integration of mutually incompatible positions. Like jurisprudence in
general, Hart appropriates the other (in this case the linguistic philosophy of
Wittgenstein) and applies it selectively so that the conclusions remain confined.
In this process, the otherness introduced by linguistic philosophy is ultimately
denied.
Fitzpatrick cites Wittgenstein's rejection of the concept of an externally
observable, objective relationship between signifier and signified as the
foundation of Hart's attempt to move beyond law's "siren call for definition, for
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encapsulating what law is in some factual formula." 4 Linguistic philosophy
suggests conceptualizing an individual's comprehension of n,I!es as the product
of the play between the external and internal elements. Moreover, this internal
element fundamentally resists reduction. Reduction reforms by leaving
something behind, so that any subsequent formulation shall be deficient. In a
sense, the making of the formulation is its unmaking.
Fitzpatrick supports Hart's conclusion that, by its nature, "the conception of
law must include the idea of a rule." 5 According to Fitzpatrick, however, this
point marks Hart's departure from the strict conclusions of linguistic philosophy.
Specifically, Hart attempts to reveal the foundations of law as a system of rules
- a factual structure. This effort relies upon a reductive reformulation of the
constituents. The very attempt conditions or determines the results. "As a
linguistic philosopher," writes Fitzpatrick, "Hart would not seek the essence of
law. He would not seek out what it is since for linguistic philosophy and for
Hart that... was a misconceived quest. Yet it is a quest on which Hart now
embarks. He bases the quest on the arbitrary and continuous reduction of law to
rules." 6
Fitzpatrick's analysis of Hart's conception of the essence of law works to
reveal the extent to which linguistic philosophy has been abandoned. He
effectively undermines Hart's conclusions by exposing the ethnocentric
foundations of his inquiry into law's social foundations. Revealing how the
answers must depend upon who formulates the questions marks a return to
linguistic philosophy. Fitzpatrick proves his point by introducing the
supplement that persists outside of the work, and forcing Hart's conclusions to
self-destruct.
Undeniably, linguistic philosophy has provided Fitzpatrick with a powerful
tool with which to attack Hart's conclusions. To this extent, the supplement has
proven to be dangerous. Accompanying Fitzpatrick on his voyage, the reader
has encountered an alternative reading of a text that undermines its fundamental
conclusions. Fitzpatrick's essay serves well as an introduction to the anthology.
The threat that linguistic philosophy presents to the integrity of Hart's text
illustrates the greater danger which exists in the diverse voices that
jurisprudence seeks to silence. Fitzpatrick concludes with a clear statement of
purpose: "this volume is a collection of dangerous supplements. It explores the
subversive implications of excluded knowledges for jurisprudence." 7 There is,
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however, an ironic difficulty that this statement overlooks.
Meaning is imported to any message by the bearer who presents it. While
the ideas behind the essays in Dangerous Supplements may be subversive, any
serious threat from their otherness has been neutralized in their re-presentation,
largely because accommodations are made to facilitate the presentation of the
volume's contents. While Fitzpatrick recognizes the necessity of compromises,
he persists in supposing that they are merely structural shortcomings, for
example, limitations upon scope and depth of coverage. They are not, in his
mind, inherently fatal to the project. The problem is that, in an anthology, it is
inevitable that the dangerous nature of the supplement is left behind, at the
margin, while a safer presentation is induced. The result is that the anthology's
voyages are more akin to sightseeing than exploring.
Dangerous Supplements is intended to be a vehicle for introducing the
broad spectrum of work that has come to be collected under the heading 'critical
theory' to the interested non-specialist. Any such effort is reductive in both
scope and depth. Inevitably, the result is a strong reliance upon categorization
and naming. These acts of containment mark a closure that is meant to facilitate
introduction at the expense of the true nature of these others - the voices with
which they speak are no longer their own. No anthology can attempt seriously
to fully survey the many, diverse perspectives that comprise critical theory.
Dangerous Supplements makes no claim to inclusivity. In fact, Fitzpatrick
explains that the volume's contents have been kept to a minimum so that cost
shall not discourage potential buyers. The inclusion of texts named as agents
provocateurs from identified schools of criticism, however, unnaturally expands
the scope of their individual responsibility. The result is a tension between the
volume's ability to include, and its desire not to exclude. This effort to forestall
closure only precipitates it. The voices within the text, burdened by the
responsibility of presenting the voices without, often overreach themselves. A
quick glance at some of the essays reveals not only these predictable
weaknesses, but also some less predictable ones.
Carol Smart' s "Feminist Jurisprudence" is plagued by one of the more
predictable shortcomings inherent in this approach. "Feminist jurisprudence,"
she explains, "has not been taken seriously although .. .it poses a very real threat
to the complacency of traditional jurisprudential thinking." 8 This threat,
however, never really materializes in Smart's essay. Beginning with a
thumbnail history of feminism, Smart arrives at a present that is reduced under
four broad headings. This categorization, a conceptual aid for the reader, is an
unfortunate compromise mandated by the nature of the anthology. The breadth
8
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of her subject is expansive and the underlying material suffers from this
unnatural compression.
According to Smart, previous efforts to construct a feminist jurisprudence
have met with limited success. They are, she explains, predisposed to failure
because of their confinement within the context of traditional jurisprudence:
"feminist jurisprudence tends to be limited by the very paradigm it seeks to
judge." 9 Grounded in a body prone to acts of closure, projects to construct a
feminist jurisprudence are, unavoidably, reductive and exclusive. They redefine
rather than eliminate the marginalized.
Smart seeks a solution that avoids this premature closure. In pursuit of this
end, her conclusion remains open, an inquiry. "The question," she writes, "is
whether feminist jurisprudence can overcome these conceptual and political
problems or whether we need to start from somewhere else fundamentally to
challenge the power of law and the heritage of traditional jurisprudence." 10 The
efficacy of this approach is, however, limited in an essay that resorts to
quartering the body of feminist jurisprudential projects. The essay's reductive
conceptualization of feminist constructions is an act antithetical to S'mart's
proposed openness. Juxtaposed against these constructions, Smart's open-ended
conclusion does not appear to threaten traditional jurisprudence as much as it
does feminist efforts to confront it. In distinguishing her perspective, Smart
confronts and rejects her predecessor's constructions. The tension inherent in
this constructed deconstruction undermines the potency of Smart's conclusion.
Alan Thomson's chapter, "Taking the Right Seriously: The Case of F.A.
Hayek," presents a very different critical voice with a very different, and
unexpected, shortcoming. The subject of Thomson's inquiry has, he explains,
suffered marginalization not because his values radically conflict with those of
traditional jurisprudence, but rather, because of their similarity. Hayek' s overtly
politicized inquiries produce results similar to those of the supposedly valueneutral inquiries of traditional jurisprudence. Thomson portrays Hayek's
exclusion from the mainstream as the product of traditional jurisprudence's
struggle to ensure that its inherent biases remain concealed.
Hayek's work is grounded in a deep skepticism of the power of reason. The
positivist efforts of what he terms Constructivist Rationalism are, he believes,
destined always to fail due to our specie's fundamental inability to predictably
manipulate social order. Instead, Hayek favours a more modest approach which
he terms Evolutionary Rationalism. This, Thomson explains, results from
Hayek's deep respect for the mechanism of the market. Since his early exposure
9
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to economics, Hayek has always regarded the market as an instrument that was
far greater than the sum of its parts. The best humanity can do is to recognize
and adapt to market signals. Attempting to lead or overcome the market will
only reduce its efficacy at our expense.
Thomson clearly explains how Hayek's doubt attacks positivist
jurisprudence by undermining the possibility of any universality grounded in
reasoned inquiry. This skepticism, he explains, demands an inquiry into the true
foundations of jurisprudence. Deprived of the facade of value-neutral reasoning,
traditional jurisprudence must be seen as a politicized construction. Hayek's
steadfast assertion that the market must prevail is an overtly political orientation.
The problem for traditional jurisprudence is that Hayek's message applies to it
as well.
Disappointingly, Thomson concludes by dismissing his subject in favour of
another approach. Having surveyed the most common criticisms of Hayek' s
work, the author rejects not only Hayek but also the entire movement. The New
Right, explains Thomson, silences the voices that proclaim the objective nature
of human experience. Its concentration upon the subjective ignores the dualistic
nature of human experience - of being both actors and acted upon. This denial
is, however, accommodated by socialism. From this conclusion, Thomson
swings across the political spectrum, abandoning neo-liberalism in favour of the
left. Confusing as this abrupt change is in itself, Thomson proceeds to
acknowledge that this alternative is itself fraught with serious weaknesses:
"although socialism itself... makes silencing claims to universal truth, it
nevertheless in my view gives valid expression to another crucial aspect of our
experience: our experience of ourselves as objects."II
Thomson concludes by clearly favouring the voice from the left over the
voice from the right. Regardless of the various arguments for and against these
two approaches, Thomson's conclusion is no less than bizarre. His mandate was
to introduce a marginalized voice and to undermine the forces that work against
it. He carries out this project, however, only to conclude by asserting his own
mode of rejection. In effect Thomson sends Hayek back to the margins from
where he emerged.
Whatever threat the anthology's underlying conceptions may constitute,
their presentation is an accommodation that leaves what is dangerous on the
outside. Fitzpatrick argues that the status quo assimilates or rejects the voices
that challenge it from beyond. It is a mistake, however, to believe that
anthologizing the supplements into a supplement does anything to undermine
this process. Fitzpatrick relies upon Wittgenstein in this regard: "it can never be
II Ibid. at 95.
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our job to reduce anything to anything." 12 Although it facilitates the process of
inquiry, the selection and compression of a diversity of perspectives into a thin
volume is an accommodation of the status quo. The very manageability of the
text undermines the danger of its contents. The anthology imports an unwanted
harmlessness, even novelty, to its contents. In doing so it demonstrates all too
clearly the insidious means by which the status quo appropriates from other
voices for its own purpose.
Dangerous Supplements serves adequately as a point from which to mount
further explorations into areas that are emerging to challenge the traditional
body of jurisprudence. As an effort to confront the assimilation and rejection of
excluded voices, however, it fails due to the complicity inherent in its
presentation. Fitzpatrick's metaphor holds inasmuch as the essays represent
voyages to encounter other perspectives. As the texts advance to meet the
reader, however, the perspectives alter. Ultimately, the voyager remains close to
shore and on pretty thick ice.
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